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Abstract  15 
The literature on rural development focuses on the socio-economic effects of agricultural support pol-16 
icies; the process of policy design, however, is devoted less attention. Identifying policy coalitions may 17 
help provide clarity on the motivations behind a given agricultural support system. Using Discourse 18 
Network Analysis, this paper studies the debates preceding the approval of the National Program for 19 
Strengthening Family Agriculture (Pronaf) in Brazil in the 90s. This represented a relevant overturn of 20 
the preceding policy framework. Two coalitions that opposed each other have been identified: while 21 
large farm business associations favoured measures to enhance productivity, movements comprising of 22 
family farmers aimed at introducing credit instruments for small producers. The strong pressure from 23 
social movements was key to the adoption of Pronaf. However, findings suggest that the Workers’ Party, 24 
which found itself in a less conflicting position, played a brokerage role in the negotiation of the final 25 
policy package. 26 
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Introduction 31 
In the history of rural development, agricultural support policies have always served as key instruments 32 
in creating employment opportunities in rural areas and in expanding farm production, thus ensuring 33 
the sustainability of the sector. They have also played a crucial social role by alleviating poverty and 34 
compensating for the high risks associated with working in agriculture. The OECD (2018) defines ag-35 
ricultural support as ‘the annual monetary value of gross transfers to agriculture from consumers and 36 
taxpayers arising from government policies that support agriculture, regardless of their objectives and 37 
economic impacts’. This broad concept encompasses a wide set of measures that can be grouped into 38 
two categories: producer support (direct payments, price support, foregone revenues, etc.), and general 39 
services aimed at creating conducive conditions for primary producers, such as institutions or infra-40 
structures (Ibidem). Although private actors may also play a role, e.g. in the provision of risk manage-41 
ment services, the agricultural sector relies heavily on public funding in both developed and emerging 42 
countries (see, e.g., the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union). For this reason, this paper 43 
focuses on the role of national institutions in designing agricultural support policies. The specific 44 
measures adopted by a country constitute its ‘agricultural policy package’, which may be shaped by 45 
several competing goals (OECD, 2017). The prevailing goals depend on which issues take leading po-46 
sitions in political debates, both internally and in the dialogue with international institutions.  47 
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The political dynamics behind the design of an ‘agricultural support package’ are particularly 48 
relevant in the case of Brazil. Agriculture has always been a fundamental sector for the Brazilian econ-49 
omy: in 2013, this country represented five percent of global agricultural production (the fourth largest 50 
share after China, the USA and India), and six percent of global agricultural exports (the third largest 51 
share after the USA and the Netherlands) (FAO, 2017). In the 90s, Brazilian agricultural support poli-52 
cies underwent impressive changes, with a corresponding impact on the evolution of the farming sector 53 
and on rural labour relations. The National System of Rural Credit (SNCR), created in 1965, served as 54 
a foundation for the modernization of Brazilian agriculture, allowing a transformation of its technical 55 
base, an increase in productivity, and the consolidation of agro-industrial complexes (Leite, 2001). Fam-56 
ily farms – which in 1996 represented about 85 percent of the country’s production units, and which 57 
used 31 percent of its total farmland (Guanziroli et al., 2001) – were almost neglected, with resources 58 
flowing to middle- and large-scale producers from the Centre-South who focused mostly on export crops 59 
(Helfand, 2001; Leite and Wesz Jr, 2014). In 1995, the National Program for Strengthening Family 60 
Agriculture (Pronaf) was thus created, with the goal of providing credit and other types of support to 61 
family farmers1 at favourable rates (Grisa, 2012; Petrini et al., 2016). Brazilian family farms exhibit 62 
both small sizes and strong links between the family and the farm in terms of labour input, income and 63 
management, in line with FAO’s (2014) definition of a family farm. 64 
The reform of the SNCR and the approval of Pronaf was preceded by extensive debates among 65 
several actors (social movements representing family farmers, associations of agro-industrial businesses, 66 
policymakers, academics, international development institutions, etc.) and in diverse contexts (the Con-67 
gress, mass media, universities, social mobilization in the streets, etc.). The conflicts between productiv-68 
ity increase and poverty reduction, farm businesses and peasants, export crops and products for internal 69 
consumption, along with the issue of ‘land struggle’, were at the core of these debates (Welch and Sauer, 70 
2015). Due to its impact on Brazilian agriculture, the resulting agricultural support policy has been ex-71 
tensively analysed in the literature (Flexor and Grisa, 2016; Garcias and Kassouf, 2016; Gazolla and 72 
Schneider, 2013; Grisa et al., 2014; Leite, 2015; Resende and Martins Mafra, 2016). However, the po-73 
litical dynamics behind these significant changes to the norm have been studied much less. Identifying 74 
the actors involved and their positions on specific issues is fundamental in understanding the logic and 75 
motivations behind Pronaf. 76 
This paper aims at assessing how political debates among key internal and external actors, in 77 
terms of their interrelations as well as their agreement or disagreement on important issues, contribute 78 
to the design of agricultural support policies. The approval of Pronaf was selected as a case study. The 79 
political-ideological linkages underlying the process of policy design, and their success or failure in 80 
influencing the final version of the programme, will be identified. Discourse Network Analysis will be 81 
used as a methodology to map such linkages. This approach allows for the analysis of political and other 82 
types of discourses in the form of networks. Through a codification of the statements of various stake-83 
holders, networks of actors sharing the same views on a topic will be created. Despite the extensive 84 
research on Brazilian agricultural policies and Pronaf mentioned above, no study has quantitatively 85 
analysed the role of socio-political actors within the design process to date, especially in the English-86 
language literature. 87 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section contains a review of the literature 88 
to detect relevant divisive issues concerning agricultural support policies. The third section outlines the 89 
main features of Pronaf and identifies the stakeholders involved in its design process. The fourth section 90 
                                                     
1 Garner and de la O Campos (2014, p. 17) develop a uniform concept of family farming or, equivalently, family 
agriculture, as ‘a means of organizing agricultural, forestry, fisheries, pastoral and aquaculture production which 
is managed and operated by a family and predominantly reliant on family labour, both women’s and men’s. The 
family and the farm are linked, coevolve and combine economic, environmental, reproductive, social and cultural 
functions’. This definition was adopted by FAO’s International Steering Committee for the International Year of 
Family Farming (FAO, 2014). The Brazilian law (article 3 of law 11,326 of July, 24 th, 2006) speaks of ‘family 
farmer or rural familiar entrepreneur’, defined based on four simultaneous criteria: (1) possession, in any form, of 
no more than four ‘fiscal modules’ of land (a measure that varies from 5 to 110 hectares, depending on the region); 
(2) predominance of family labour; (3) minimum share (defined by the government) of family income obtained 
from family farm activities; (4) direct family management of the farm (Sanches Peraci, 2011). Since this is an 
official definition in Brazil, we use it in the rest of this paper. 
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illustrates the methodology and the data collection process. Results are presented in the fifth section 91 
and discussed in the sixth section, with a final section reserved for the conclusion. 92 
 93 
Literature review: agricultural support policies 94 
‘Agricultural support packages’ need to be effective with respect to public goals, which vary depending 95 
on the country and the ruling party. These goals include ensuring food security, improving rural living 96 
standards, promoting sustainable production, building resilience, providing public goods, achieving in-97 
clusive development, etc. (OECD, 2017). Besides monetary support to producers, the provision of ser-98 
vices – education and training, physical infrastructure, information and innovation sharing systems – is 99 
important in the achievement of these goals. Furthermore, support packages need to be coherent and 100 
well-integrated in national economic policies and international dynamics (Ibidem). 101 
An important component of agricultural support packages is rural credit provision. Rural credit 102 
provision has always served as one of the main policies used to support agriculture in developing coun-103 
tries. Until the mid-60s, the international organizations behind agricultural policies, primarily the World 104 
Bank (WB), targeted mostly large-scale commercial farmers to interrupt the ‘vicious circle’ of low 105 
incomes, low savings and low productivity (Ellis, 1992, p. 155). Later, the focus shifted to small family 106 
farmers due to their higher efficiency and production potential, their lack of financing opportunities 107 
beyond local moneylenders, and the expected positive impact on rural poverty (Ibidem). The equity 108 
dimension has become even more relevant since the dawn of the 70s (Ibidem). Still, rural credit policies 109 
today are driven by diverse goals (increase productivity, fight rural poverty, etc.) and targets (such as 110 
specific crops or social groups), and rely on diverse institutions (state agricultural banks, commercial 111 
banks, multi-purpose agencies, etc.) and instruments (low interest rates, tax concessions, etc.). Based 112 
on a review of the literature on agricultural support policies, 19 divisive topics concerning the potential 113 
objectives, targets, instruments and institutions of support policies, and which are likely to be discussed 114 
by policymakers, have been identified. We refer to these topics as ‘divisive’ because the political strug-115 
gle over agricultural policies is polarizing, and it is always difficult to arrive at a compromise between 116 
opposing positions (Paarlberg, 2013). These topics, summarized in Table 1, are used to classify the 117 
statements of the actors involved in the design of Pronaf. 118 
The first group of topics concerns the goals of agricultural support. A first potential goal is to 119 
increase the incomes of people working in agriculture (both family farmers and hired workers). The 120 
actors supporting this statement argue that agricultural support should aim primarily at improving the 121 
living conditions of rural people. The second potential goal concerns agricultural productivity: its sup-122 
porters argue that the increase of farm productivity should be the main goal of any agricultural policy, 123 
regardless of the destination of resources or the distribution of the resulting benefits. The third potential 124 
goal is to achieve technical innovation. Actors backing this goal assign a great deal of importance to 125 
the technological level of farms; hence, they aim primarily at stimulating the adoption of new technol-126 
ogies (machineries, high-yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, irrigation systems, etc.). Many authors 127 
argue that the ability of rural households to adopt innovation, including new products and techniques, 128 
increases if they have access to credit (De Souza Filho et al., 1999; Vicente and Vosti, 1995). The three 129 
goals mentioned above are usually intertwined; for example, higher per capita incomes increase saving 130 
rates and, thus, investments and productivity (Fuglie et al., 2012; Guyomard et al., 2004). 131 
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Table 1. List of divisive topics concerning agricultural support policies.  154 
Topics References 
Goal 1: increasing farm incomes / rural salaries Delgado, 2010; Guyomard et al., 2004 
Goal 2: increasing productivity 
Fuglie et al., 2012; Gasques et al., 2012; Pretty et al., 
2010 
Goal 3: stimulating technological innovation 
 De Souza Filho et al., 1999; Vicente and Vosti, 1995; 
Vieira Filho and de Silveira, 2012 
Target 1: profit-oriented (vs. subsistence farmers) Delgado, 2010; Diaz Osorio, 2007; Hazell et al., 2007 
Target 2: family farmers (vs. juridical persons) 
Delgado, 2010; Diaz Osorio, 2007; Grisa and Schneider, 
2014; Hazell et al., 2007 
Target 3: specific productions (vs. single farm pay-
ment) 
Helfand, 2001; Helfand and de Rezende, 2004 
Target 4: small farms (vs. large farms) Castro, 2010; Helfand, 2001; Wolford, 2005 
Target 5: export productions (vs. self-consumption 
goods) 
Delgado, 2010; Grisa and Schneider, 2014; Helfand, 
2001 
Instrument 1: financial sustainability of the credit 
programme 
Bittencourt et al., 2005; Grisa and Schneider, 2014; Ku-
mar, 2005 
Instrument 2: tax concessions for commercializa-
tion 
Aksoy and Beghin, 2005; Schiff and Valdés, 1992 
Instrument 3: fair access to land (property rights), 
even by means of expropriation 
Dethier and Effenberger, 2012; Norder, 2014; Ondetti, 
2016 
Instrument 4: reduction of the power of informal 
financial intermediaries 
Braverman and Guasch, 1986; Gagliardi, 2008 
Instrument 5: monitoring for financing continuity Gunes and Movassaghi, 2017; Westercamp et al., 2015 
Instrument 6: linking farms and researchers (vs. 
customer approach) 
Rivera and Sulaiman, 2009; Sumberg et al., 2012 
Instrument 7: farmers’ training Evenson, 2001; Feder et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2004 
Instrument 8: public subsidies (vs. private loans) Delgado, 2012; Turvey, 2013 
Institution 1: rural advisory services Meyer, 2011; McMahon, 2012 
Institution 2: producer cooperatives 
Ellis, 1992; FAO, 2014; Markelova et al., 2009; Smith 
and Rothbaum, 2013 
Institution 3: State agricultural banks Turvey, 2013; Westercamp et al., 2015 
 155 
The second group of topics concerns the targets of agricultural support. The first divisive issue 156 
focuses on whether policies should primarily target profit-oriented farmers who aim at maximizing their 157 
revenues, or subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers who strive to achieve decent life conditions. The 158 
second dilemma concerns whether funding and services should be provided primarily to family farmers 159 
(i.e., physical persons) or to juridical entities (e.g. corporations). This issue is particularly relevant in 160 
Brazil, as the concept of ‘family farms’, which  replaced that of ‘small producers’, was at the core of 161 
the mobilizations which led to the approval of Pronaf (Welch and Sauer, 2015). The third divisive issue 162 
surrounds the supporters of funding aimed at specific crop or animal productions, and their opposition 163 
who favour the provision of generic loans and subsidies (such as the single farm payments of the EU 164 
Common Agricultural Policy). The fourth topic surrounds the advocates of small farmers, generally 165 
moved by equity concerns, and their opposition who opine that large producers deserve special attention 166 
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due to their role within the national economy (Helfand, 2001). The fifth topic concerns the destination 167 
of crop and animal produce that benefited from policy interventions: on one side are actors who propose 168 
that export produce (for Brazil: beef, chicken meat, soy, fruit juice, sugar, cotton, coffee, etc.) should be 169 
given priority over produce intended for self-consumption or for local markets. This issue is particularly 170 
relevant due to the role of Brazilian agriculture in international markets, which led former president 171 
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva to promote national produce and free agricultural trade in supranational con-172 
texts. Many of these targets are closely related; indeed, due to the official definition adopted in Brazil, 173 
family farms tend to be of small sizes, leading small producers to focus mostly on local markets rather 174 
than on exports (Diaz Osorio, 2007; Hazell et al., 2007). 175 
The third group of divisive topics concerns the instruments or strategies implemented to achieve 176 
effective agricultural support. The first instrument concerns the financial sustainability of the policy 177 
package. Stakeholders in support of this statement maintain that policies should be financially sustain-178 
able, meaning that the economic returns (e.g., taxation of resulting profits) should overcome or at least 179 
equal the costs. Within this framework, non-repayable loans aimed at helping poor farmers bear their 180 
costs, for example, are unlikely to be adopted. The second instrument deals with the manner of financing 181 
producers. Actors backing this statement believe that tax concessions (e.g. on the products commercial-182 
ized) are preferable to subsidies or loans. According to the FAO (2001), compensation for high taxation 183 
on agriculture enables farmers to be more competitive. The third instrument entails a radical approach: 184 
ensuring fair access to land, even if by means of a land reform. In large countries where many farmers 185 
fall under the poverty threshold, access to land is an actual issue. The assignment of property rights to 186 
disadvantaged people is a driver of innovation adoption and, thus, of farm modernization (Dethier and 187 
Effenberger, 2012). In Brazil, article 186 of the 1988 Constitution foresees the possibility of expropri-188 
ation for social interests and is, thus, at the core of the claims of social movements (Norder, 2014). The 189 
fourth instrument addresses the power of private intermediaries who may adopt an ‘exploitative or mo-190 
nopolistic behaviour’ (Ellis, 1992, p. 155). Proponents of this statement aim to address corruption and 191 
the inability of rural markets to avoid, for example, loan-sharking situations. The fifth instrument con-192 
cerns the evaluation of how resources are utilized by their recipients. Supporters of this option are of 193 
the opinion that the continuity of credit and service provision should be bound to constant monitoring 194 
or to positive before-after assessments. Braverman and Guasch (1986) point out that rural financial mar-195 
kets are unable to monitor the use of funds. It is for this reason, for example, that France, in 1956, created 196 
the Centres of Rural Economy, which were responsible for monitoring the management of subsidized 197 
loans (Westercamp et al., 2015). The sixth instrument concerns the idea of connecting public and private 198 
researchers with farmers, as opposed to adopting a customer approach, as these connections may ensure 199 
better focus on farmers’ priorities (Sumberg et al., 2012; FAO, 2014). A seventh instrument is agricul-200 
tural training and technical assistance. Its backers believe that formal education (provided, e.g., by rural 201 
extension services), a fundamental component in any agricultural support package, must be assigned 202 
importance. A last divisive issue with respect to instruments concerns the nature of producer support, 203 
that is, whether public or private (market-based). Actors on one side prefer public subsidies, while those 204 
on the other side suggest that loans should comply with market rules, so that profitability for the issuing 205 
institution prevails over the welfare implications for their recipients. Although these eight propositions 206 
are not exhaustive of all potential instruments, they cover a wide range of issues and do not necessarily 207 
contradiction one another. 208 
The fourth group of divisive topics deals with the institutions in charge of providing producer sup-209 
port and services. The first type of institution is represented by agricultural extension services, institu-210 
tions concerned with providing free goods (e.g., better-performing seeds) and services (e.g., training on 211 
how to use new seed varieties). Actors in favour consider public extension services to be important in-212 
stitutions. A second type of institution is represented by cooperatives and farmer groups (either state-213 
sponsored or resulting from farmers’ initiatives), which ‘are often used as the ultimate lender to farmers’, 214 
and may also become ‘viable local credit organizations in their own right’ (Ellis, 1992, p. 158). Actors 215 
in support of this type of institutions believe that agricultural policies should stimulate cooperation 216 
among producers and rely on the resulting organisations to be more effective. A third type of institution 217 
is represented by state agricultural banks (as opposed to private credit institutions). Brazil opted very 218 
early for a mixed banking system, leaving the states of the federation free to choose their preferred 219 
system (Westercamp et al., 2015). Actors who support this third type of institution support the public 220 
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option. Broadly speaking, the debate on institutions is based on two clashing ‘schools of thought’: the 221 
supporters of public intervention, who deem it necessary to attract urban capital, and the advocates of 222 
minimalist regulation, who have dominated during the past decades (Turvey et al., 2013, p. 210). 223 
 224 
The Brazilian case study  225 
From the SNCR to Pronaf: a brief context2  226 
Brazil is ‘a relatively industrialized middle-income country that maintains a significant family farm 227 
sector oriented to the domestic market, while also playing a key role in the global agri-food sector as a 228 
dominant agricultural exporter’ (Graeub et al. 2016, pp. 1-2). This strong dualism (reflected in agricul-229 
tural support policies), coupled with the fact that agriculture continues to play a fundamental economic, 230 
commercial and social role (FAO, 2017), justifies the choice of this country as a case study. The federal 231 
government of Brazil has also implemented various public policies over the years. These include mac-232 
roeconomic (fiscal, monetary, trade and exchange rate policies), sectorial (rural credit, technical assis-233 
tance, price and market policies, etc.), as well as intersectoral interventions (economic, infrastructural, 234 
labour, environmental, social, territorial planning, etc.) (Delgado, 2001; Delgado, 2012; Favareto, 2007; 235 
Heredia et al., 2010). 236 
The SNCR was created by law 4829 of November 5th, 1965 to support agricultural investments 237 
(from the purchase of farm equipment to the building of infrastructures), cover the costs of production 238 
and commercialization of farm output and increase productivity, among other goals. The SNCR repre-239 
sented the foundation for the modernization of Brazilian agriculture. Indeed, it allowed for a successful 240 
transformation of the technical assets of the farms, an increase in agricultural productivity, the consol-241 
idation of agro-industrial complexes, as well as the integration of agricultural capital in financial net-242 
works (Leite, 2001). However, prior to the mid-90s, the SNCR had mostly favoured medium and large-243 
scale farms in Central and Southern Brazil that produce coffee, soy, sugar cane, oranges and cotton, and 244 
that are mostly export-oriented (Gonçalves Neto, 1997; Graziano da Silva, 2003; Helfand, 2001). A 245 
large share of farms, accounting for about 70 percent of the total, did not have access to credit 246 
(Bianchini, 2015, p. 16) and, therefore, could not enjoy the benefits associated with the SNCR. These 247 
consisted mostly of family farms. 248 
Family farming is a system historically present in the Brazilian countryside3. Although often 249 
invisible in analyses dating to the colonial and imperial periods, which focused on large property and 250 
their production for foreign markets, small farmers were present in all regions of Brazil (Delgado, 251 
2004). Based on data from 1960, Queiroz (2009, p. 61) points out that ‘Brazil, contrary to what is 252 
commonly said, is not a predominantly monoculture country, but a country of polycultures; small pol-253 
yculture farms provide food to the sixty million inhabitants of Brazil and employ the majority of the 254 
rural workforce’. 255 
However, the family farming sector of Brazilian agriculture was hit particularly severely by the 256 
advent of modernization, which fostered land and income concentration, rural outmigration, environ-257 
mental problems, etc. (Graziano da Silva, 2003; Teixeira, 2005). Family farms became even more vul-258 
nerable in the economic context of the 80s, characterized by deep crisis, stagnation, indebtedness and 259 
inflation, and of the 90s, during which the Brazilian economy underwent economic liberalizations, re-260 
gional integration and privatizations (Bianchini, 2015; Grisa, 2012). 261 
The political liberalization that followed the end of the military dictatorship in the 80s allowed 262 
for the rebirth of civil society organizations such as trade unions and social movements inspired by 263 
landless people, rural workers and family farmers. In this context, the agrarian reform, along with the 264 
expansion of the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST), gained a lot of visibility, resulting in the for-265 
mulation of a National Plan for Agrarian Reform (PNRA) by the government in 1985. In addition, the 266 
                                                     
2 To further this debate, see Bianchini (2015), Grisa (2012), Mattei (2010), Moruzzi Marques (2004), Picolotto 
(2011), and Santos (2011). 
3 In Brazil, the concept of ‘family farming’, both as a productive system and as a socio-political entity, was defined 
in the 90s by social movements, academics, and politicians who contributed to the design of state policies and 
norms, thus gradually replacing the categories of ‘smallholders’, ‘subsistence farmers’, ‘low-income producers’, 
etc. (Guanziroli et al., 2012; Picolotto, 2011; Medeiros, 2001; Schneider, 2006). 
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National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) began drawing up a proposal for a differ-267 
entiated agricultural policy for small producers in 1986. During this same period, the Workers’ Unified 268 
Centre (Central Única dos Trabalhadores, CUT) also had among its guidelines an agricultural policy 269 
focused on the interests of small producers and workers (Picolotto, 2011). These social movements 270 
played a very important role in the recognition of the sector and its demands. 271 
 To support small producers, the government of Itamar Franco (1992-1995) created, in 1994, the 272 
Program for Valorising Small Agricultural Production (Programa de Valorização da pequena 273 
Produção Rural, Provap), which relied almost exclusively on resources from the National Development 274 
Bank (BNDS). The federal government tried to encourage the activities of small farmers, and this had 275 
a significant impact on food production (Schultz and Ahlert, 2016). Thus, Provap was followed by 276 
Pronaf, and by the Program for the Generation of Employment and Rural Income (Proger Rural), which 277 
also depended on BNDS funding sources and other public funds (Schneider et al., 2004). By recognizing 278 
the peculiarities of family farms, the new norms provided credit and services to this socioeconomic 279 
group at favourable rates, in a manner different from the SNCR (Grisa, 2012). This represented the first 280 
national-level policy that specifically targeted the needs of family farmers (Schneider et al., 2004). 281 
Since its approval, Pronaf has experienced several modifications. Besides the regular changes 282 
brought about by the yearly Family Farm Harvest Plan (Plano Safra da Agricultura Familiar), which 283 
defines adjustments in credit lines, financing conditions and volumes of available resources, Pronaf has 284 
undergone three major phases. The first phase spanned from its creation to the end of Fernando Hen-285 
rique Cardoso’s government in 2002. It represented a period of operationalization of the programme by 286 
improving credit facilities, regulating access conditions, as well as mandating rural finance institutions 287 
to reach out to those historically excluded from agricultural policies (Abramovay and Veiga, 1999; 288 
Copetti, 2008; Mattei, 2006; Schneider et al., 2004). 289 
The second phase of Pronaf spanned between president Lula’s first term and president Dilma 290 
Rousseff’s first term (2003-2014). It was characterized by a boosting of the resources endowed, an 291 
enlargement of the geographical focus to cover the entire federation, more flexibility of financial rules 292 
(interest rates reduction, deferment of payments, increase of the resources thresholds per contract, etc.), 293 
enlargement and diversification of the beneficiaries (by gender, age, and activity), simplification of 294 
access conditions, and a revision and diversification of the funding system (De Souza et al., 2013; 295 
Mattei, 2012; Gazolla and Schneider, 2013; Grisa et al., 2014; Capellesso et al., 2018). 296 
The third phase began with Rousseff’s second term as president, was consolidated during her 297 
impeachment, and continues to date. Data provided by the Central Bank of Brazil (2018) showed that 298 
between 2014 and 2017, Pronaf was affected by a reduction in the volume of funds, a decrease in the 299 
number of contracts, and a decrease in the value of subsidies paid by the government to stabilize the 300 
interest rates. The most recent data on rural credit indicates concentration and exclusion in Brazilian 301 
agriculture (Bianchini, 2018). However, these processes are much broader than specific changes in Pro-302 
naf: they represent an overturn in public policy and in the institutional framework of family farming, as 303 
many programs have been blocked, reformulated, or placed under review. The marginalisation of family 304 
agriculture in the nation’s political and institutional scene became clear with the abolition of the Min-305 
istry of Agrarian Development and other agencies linked to rural development, which represented the 306 
main basis of legitimacy and support for sectorial policies (Niederle et al., 2017). 307 
The transformations that took place during these three phases also led to changes in the political 308 
coalitions supporting specific policies. However, within this paper, we focus only on the initial period 309 
of  policy design. 310 
 311 
Actors involved in the design process of Pronaf 312 
The design of Pronaf involved various different actors (Bianchini, 2015; Grisa, 2014; Moruzzi Marques, 313 
2004; Picolotto, 2011; Santos, 2011; Schneider et al., 2004). These actors can be grouped into three 314 
categories: civil society organisations, political actors, and international multilateral organisations. The 315 
list of actors whose statements were analysed for this paper are reported in Table 2. 316 
Civil society organisations include two main interest groups: ‘on the one hand, the institutions 317 
representing large landlords and agricultural capital; on the other hand, the institutions which supported 318 
the adoption of ad hoc policies for small farmers, the consolidation of the agrarian reform, the expansion 319 
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of the rights of rural workers, and a more sustainable agricultural model’ (Bianchini, 2015, p. 19). 320 
Among the former were the Confederation of Farming and Breeding of Brazil (CNA), the Brazilian 321 
Association of Agribusiness (ABAG), the Brazilian Rural Society (SRB) and the Organization of Bra-322 
zilian Cooperatives (OCB). These organizations were able to influence Brazilian politics because of 323 
their high level of institutionalization, the presence of a political leader within their structures (Zani and 324 
da Costa, 2014), and the alliance they had built with urban entrepreneurs and politicians (Paulino, 2014). 325 
The organizations supporting family farmers included CONTAG, as well as recently founded groups 326 
such as the MST and the National Department of Rural Workers of the Workers’ Unified Centre 327 
(DNTR/CUT). Despite programme divergences (Grisa, 2012; Picolotto, 2011), these groups amalga-328 
mated with organizations of fishermen, natives, rubber trappers, and other groups damaged by national 329 
agricultural policies, to organize the first Brazilian Land’s Cry (I Grito da Terra Brasil), which took 330 
place in the capital in May 1994. These groups put in a series of claims that focused on the need for an 331 
ad hoc credit policy for small farmers (Grito da Terra Brasil, 1994). In 1995, a second Cry was orga-332 
nized4. These mobilizations were at the core of the creation of Pronaf, as they forced the Ministry of 333 
Agriculture and the Bank of Brazil to negotiate with the organizations representing family farmers 334 
(Vasconcellos and Vasconcellos, 2012) and implement a course of action favoured by them (Wesz Jr., 335 
2010). 336 
The so-called political actors consisted of individuals in state institutions. These actors repre-337 
sented different interests (their social basis, their political party, their territory, etc.) and were subject to 338 
contrasting pressures (interest groups, desire to achieve re-election, etc.). Between 1995 and 1998, eight 339 
main parties were represented in the Brazilian Congress (Chamber of Deputies and Senate): the Brazil-340 
ian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), the Liberal Front Party (PFL), the Brazilian Social Democ-341 
racy Party (PSDB), the Progressive Party (PP) – which became the Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB) 342 
after a number of splits –, the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), the Workers’ Party (PT), and the Demo-343 
cratic Labour Party (PDT). In addition to these parties, we will also consider the smaller National Re-344 
construction Party (PRN) (Braga and Bourdoukan 2010). Only the PT and the PDT opposed the gov-345 
ernment of Cardoso (PSDB), while a coalition of the other six parties ‘provided the executive with a 346 
parliamentary support close to 75 percent of the seats’ (Couto and Abrucio, 2003, p. 276). In Brazil 347 
there is no ‘agrarian party’: the interests of large landlords and agricultural entrepreneurs are advocated 348 
by the Parliamentary Front for Agriculture (the so-called ‘Bancada Ruralista’5), which played a core 349 
role in the debate on Pronaf (Barcelos and Berriel, 2009; Vigna, 2007). The Bancada Ruralista includes 350 
congressmen from many centre-right parties and is one of the most powerful interest groups in the 351 
Brazilian Congress (Ibidem). On the other hand, the interests of peasant movements and rural trade 352 
unions were advocated by centre-left congressmen from different parties, but in a less organized manner 353 
(Mendes Pereira, 2007). 354 
As for international organizations, the most influential during the elaboration of Pronaf were the 355 
World Bank (WB) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (Flexor and 356 
Grisa, 2014). The former, known for its support of free-market policies (Wade, 2010), carried out some 357 
studies in collaboration with Brazilian researchers, the findings of which were summarized within re-358 
ports (World Bank, 1994a; 1994b) and divulged to the public in workshops and other events. These 359 
reports recognized the predominance of small and medium-sized family farms and their importance for 360 
job creation and agro-food production. Furthermore, they diagnosed that these farms had been penalized 361 
by the SNCR. Nevertheless, they recommended a reduction of public intervention in agriculture, with 362 
a view to stimulate a ‘market-oriented’ approach within this sector (Vigna, 2001; 2007). Simultane-363 
ously, the FAO – in cooperation with the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (IN-364 
CRA), and with the support of Brazilian researchers – worked on the elaboration of an operational def-365 
inition of family farming, while stressing the socio-economic role of this sector for Brazil. FAO’s def-366 
inition was then used to design public policy measures targeted at this group (Guanziroli, 1995). 367 
The above-mentioned categories of actors shared strong linkages and never operated as totally 368 
separate groups. For example, the pressure of civil society organizations on their political representatives 369 
                                                     
4 The I and II Brazilian Land’s Cry are a wide range of mobilizations carried out by social movements throughout 
the country: State Governments and the Federal Government negotiated a series of guidelines with these move-
ments, mainly regarding rural policies (Picolotto, 2011). Such mobilizations continued in later years. 
5 To know more about the Bancada Ruralista in Brazil, see Simionatto and Rodrigues Costa (2012). 
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(deputies and senators) allowed the former to have their interests recognized in the decisional arena. 370 
Some leaders of these organizations were elected to Congress and could thus work as part of the group 371 
of political actors. Another example is represented by multilateral organizations, whose reports were 372 
often mentioned by politicians or cited in advertising messages prepared by civil society organizations. 373 
As already mentioned, FAO’s recommendations were elaborated courtesy of the support of public serv-374 
ants, researchers, trade unionists, and civil society leaders. 375 
 376 
 377 
Table 2. Actors involved in the design proces of Pronaf, whose statements were analysed. 378 
Acronym English name Original name Category Coalition 
ABAG 
Brazilian Association of Ag-
ribusiness 
Associação Brasileira do 
Agronegócio 
civil society 
organisation 
productivity-fo-
cused group 
CNA 
Confederation of Farming 
and Breeding of Brazil 
Confederação da Agricultura e 
Pecuária do Brasil 
civil society 
organisation 
productivity-fo-
cused group 
CONTAG 
National Confederation of 
Agricultural Workers 
Confederação Nacional dos Tra-
balhadores na Agricultura 
civil society 
organisation 
welfare-focused 
group 
DNTR/CUT 
National Department of Ru-
ral Workers of the Workers’ 
Unified Centre  
Departamento Nacional dos Tra-
balhadores Rurais/Central Única 
dos Trabalhadores 
civil society 
organisation 
welfare-focused 
group 
FAO 
Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization of the United Nations   
 international 
organisation 
  
MST 
Landless Workers’ Move-
ment 
Movimento Sem Terra 
civil society 
organisation 
welfare-focused 
group 
PDT Democratic Labour Party Partido Democrático Trabalhista political party   
PFL Liberal Front Party Partido da Frente Liberal political party   
PMDB 
Brazilian Democratic Move-
ment Party 
Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro 
political party   
PP Progressive Party Partido Progressista political party   
PPB Brazilian Progressive Party Partido Progressista Brasileiro political party   
PRN 
National Reconstruction 
Party 
Partido da Reconstrução Nacional political party   
PT Workers’ Party Partido dos Trabalhadores political party   
PTB Brazilian Labour Party Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro political party   
SRB Brazilian Rural Society Sociedade Rural Brasileira 
civil society 
organisation 
productivity-fo-
cused group 
WB World Bank  
international 
organisation 
  
 379 
Methodology and data 380 
Discourse Network Analysis 381 
Political discourses are often neglected in the explanation of political processes (Schmidt and Radaelli, 382 
2004), despite their role in shaping the actions of political actors (Schmidt, 2008). The presence of 383 
groups of actors of equal social standing affects political processes because each group tries to impose 384 
its perspective on the others (Hajer, 1993). This is pointed out within the Advocacy Coalition Frame-385 
work (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), which states that policymaking is an ongoing 386 
process, and that political groups with similar interests and beliefs collaborate with each other to reach 387 
their goals. Shared beliefs are the basis for coalition formation among actors involved in the political 388 
arena (Fischer et al., 2017; Sabatier and Weible 2007). 389 
To influence political processes, group members must show strong ideational congruence among 390 
themselves and dominate the discursive space, and their political practices must reflect this discursive 391 
dominance (Leifeld and Haunss, 2012). This is particularly true in the case of continuously discussed 392 
political conflicts, during which coalitions constantly realign their stances in order to prevail over oth-393 
ers: coalition members must share the same point of view and be consistent, in terms of common argu-394 
ments, if they want to become dominant. 395 
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Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) is a methodology developed by Leifeld (2009) to measure 396 
and visualize policy discourses. It uses tools derived from Social Network Analysis (SNA) to map the 397 
relationships within a group of actors and analyse the characteristics of their network. By identifying the 398 
main arguments discussed and assigning them to each actor, the methodology allows for the measure-399 
ment of similarities among the latter, thus identifying discourse coalitions as well as sub-coalitions 400 
within a discourse coalition. Actors are not classified into separate categories but may be connected 401 
through various paths. DNA has been used to analyse political or media discourses on environmental 402 
(Brugger, 2016; Fisher et al., 2013) as well as economic themes (Leifeld, 2013; Leifeld and Haunss, 403 
2012). To our knowledge, this is the first attempt of using it to assess issues related to agricultural 404 
policy. 405 
For any debate studied, the statements of each actor are coded by considering three variables: the 406 
organization of membership, the issue addressed, and the position taken (in favour or against). Such a 407 
process results in the creation of an actor-by-issue matrix. This matrix is subsequently converted into a 408 
square actor-by-actor matrix (a so-called co-occurrence matrix), where each cell represents the number 409 
of shared issue stances between pairs of actors (Fischer et al., 2013). Using this matrix, five types of 410 
discourse networks can be generated: affiliation, actor congruence, conflict, concept-congruence, and 411 
dynamic discourse networks (Leifeld and Haunss, 2012).  412 
For our research, we first computed two ‘actor congruence networks’: one displaying the number 413 
of statements agreed upon by each pair of actors, and the other indicating the number of statements on 414 
which each pair of actors disagreed. In both networks, the strength of a tie (edge weight) between two 415 
actors depended on the number of common (positive or negative) statements. From these two networks, 416 
it was then possible to draw up the ‘conflict network’ (Leifeld and Haunss, 2012). The ‘conflict network’ 417 
indicates the number of statements on which each pair of actors had discordant opinions. Within a 418 
‘conflict network’, the thickness of the edge weights is computed by summing up the number of dis-419 
cordances between actors on the same statements. 420 
Once the above-mentioned networks have been created, network statistics are used to detect the 421 
actors who are most influential based on the nature of their relations (the congruence of their political 422 
views with other stakeholders’ political views). Network statistics give a quantitative measure of the 423 
power of each actor and an interpretation of his or her centrality. We used ‘betweenness centrality’ to 424 
detect actor relevance. This indicator considers the whole network when computing individual scores 425 
and identifies where actors are placed within the network. It is computed using the following formula: 426 
 427 
𝐵𝐶𝑘 = ∑
𝜎𝑖𝑘𝑗
𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑖≠𝑗≠𝑘
 429 
 428 
where σikj is the number of geodesics linking actors i and j through k, and σij is the total number of 430 
geodesics linking actors i and j (Prell, 2012). This measure identifies within the network the actors who 431 
are more strategic due to their brokerage position (based on their political stance). Given that we are 432 
interested in analysing the political discourse framework that emerged during the discussion of Brazil’s 433 
Pronaf, ‘betweenness centrality’ allows us to identify actors in less conflicting positions: a low level of 434 
‘betweenness centrality’ indicates that an actor was less involved in the conflict, and vice versa. 435 
 436 
Data collection and coding procedure 437 
The dataset for the analysis was created using the following procedure. First, we selected relevant doc-438 
uments from which we could extrapolate actor statements on every issue. Four types of documents were 439 
considered: public declarations, original reports, parliamentary speeches, and newspaper articles, all 440 
dating back to the three-year period of 1994–1996. Despite the fact that political documents involve a 441 
high likelihood of exaggeration of ideological political perspectives, we assumed that every statement 442 
issued by an organization, or by one of its members, was illustrative of the political position of said 443 
organization, and that an analysis of its policy beliefs would explain the courses of action taken by the 444 
legislator (Fischer et al., 2013; Sabatier and Weible 2007). 445 
Overall, we analysed 123 documents containing 222 statements. With regard to international organiza-446 
tions, the reports considered were independently published by the FAO or the WB (Guanziroli, 1995; 447 
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World Bank, 1994a; 1994b). These reports highlighted the need for Brazilian institutions to correct 448 
market failures and strengthen family farming. Trade unions and social movements also produced many 449 
documents and reports on agricultural support policies. To assess their role in the process of negotiation 450 
of Pronaf, we analysed their official public declarations, institutional reports, and newspaper articles. 451 
Finally, to identify the orientation of political parties, we analysed the speeches delivered in the Brazilian 452 
Senate during the plenary sessions of the three-year period, 1994-1996. Among the senators whose 453 
speeches were analysed, at least two (Jonas Pinheiro and Júlio Campos) belonged to the Bancada Ru-454 
ralista. We decided not to consider the debates that took place in the Chamber of Deputies because, 455 
being mainly concerned with local issues, they did not help to reveal the positions of the parties on 456 
general agricultural support policies. Due to the large number of declarations available, the search terms 457 
‘Pronaf’ and ‘agricultural policy’ (in Portuguese and English) were used to identify speeches of poten-458 
tial interest within the database of the Senate (Brazil, Federal Senate, 2017). 459 
 460 
Table 3. Heatmap: positive statements (green), negative statements (red), and lack of opinion (white). 461 
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Goal 1: increasing farm incomes                                  
Goal 2: increasing productivity                                 
Goal 3: stimulating technical innova-
tion 
                                
Target 1: profit-oriented farmers                                 
Target 2: family farmers                                 
Target 3: specific productions                                 
Target 4: small farmers                                 
Target 5: export productions                                 
Instrument 1: financial sustainability                                 
Instrument 2: tax concessions                               
Instrument 3: fair access to land                                
Instrument 4: reduce the power of in-
termediaries 
                              
Instrument 5: monitoring                                 
Instrument 6: linking farms to research                                 
Instrument 7: farmers’ training                                 
Instrument 8: public subsidies                                 
Institution 1: rural advisory services                                
Institution 2: producer cooperatives                                 
Institution 3: State agricultural banks                                 
Total 17 16 16 16 9 17 17 15 13 14 10 14 8 8 8 12 
 462 
We conducted the coding process manually, based on the list of divisive topics identified above. 463 
For each of the 19 topics, we registered whether an actor had shown agreement, disagreement, or a lack 464 
of an opinion on it. Overall, 26 physical or juridical persons, belonging to 16 different organizations 465 
(our actors proper) were considered. We assumed the opinions expressed by all senators to be repre-466 
sentative of the positions of their parties. No contradictions were observed amongst the opinions of 467 
different senators belonging to the same party, allowing for a straightforward aggregation of their opin-468 
ions6. We did not assign specific weights to the stakeholders – despite the plausible assumption that 469 
                                                     
6 Some examples of the coding procedure are illustrated below. 
a) Actor alfa (PP): ‘Então, do meu ponto de vista, se o Governo não quer ou não pode subsidiar a Agricultura, 
deve, pelo menos, adotar uma política coerente com essa impossibilidade, que é não permitir que produtos 
produzidos nessas regiões do mundo mais fortes economicamente, que subsidiam a produção e a exportação 
de produtos agrícolas, não ingressem em nosso País sem as alíquotas de proteção ao produto nacional. Proteger 
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some political actors are more important than others in the legislative process, and that their importance 470 
varies with the number of seats – because we focused solely on the debates preceding the implementa-471 
tion of Pronaf, during which all actors had equal opportunities to express their views. The outcome of 472 
the coding procedure is illustrated in Table 3. This outcome was analysed using the DNA software 473 
(Leifeld, 2010) and Ucinet (Borgatti et al., 2002). 474 
 475 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 476 
Analysis of the results 477 
To begin, we identified the actors who managed to prevail, i.e. to contribute more to the policy outcome 478 
by avoiding conflicts. Table 4 reports the percentage of actors who mentioned each of the topics identi-479 
fied, and specifies whether their statements were in favour or against. Three important insights can be 480 
deduced from the table. First, economic goals, such as raising farm incomes, productivity and profits, 481 
were always mentioned, while topics related to socio-political aims, such as reducing the level of cor-482 
ruption, providing training, developing advisory services, and monitoring the way money was used, 483 
played a minor role. Second, despite being mentioned by many, the topics linked to general financial 484 
issues, such as focusing on export production (target 5) or achieving financial sustainability (instrument 485 
1) were supported only by a few stakeholders. In particular, only eight percent of those who mentioned 486 
the financial sustainability of the policy, and 27 percent of those who mentioned support for export 487 
productions, were in favour. These issues are usually pursued by large farm businesses, who are inter-488 
ested in market-based financing and are oriented towards external markets. Third, the most divisive top-489 
ics were the support for specific productions (target 3), the adoption of measures to ensure fair access 490 
to land (instrument 3), and the creation of state agricultural banks (institution 3), suggesting that the 491 
role of the government was a key matter of debate.  492 
 493 
Table 4. Percentage of actors that mentioned each topic, and percentage who agreed or disagreed.  494 
Statement Mentioning (%) Agreeing (%) Disagreeing (%) 
Goal 1: increasing farm incomes/salaries 100 100 0 
Goal 2: increasing productivity 100 100 0 
Goal 3: stimulating technological innovation 94 93 7 
Target 1: profit-oriented farmers 100 94 6 
Target 2: family farmers 88 79 21 
Target 3: specific productions 56 56 44 
Target 4: small farmers 81 77 23 
Target 5: export productions 94 27 73 
Instrument 1: financial sustainability 75 8 92 
Instrument 2: tax concessions 69 73 27 
Instrument 3: fair access to land 56 56 44 
Instrument 4: reduce power of informal intermediaries 0 NA NA 
Instrument 5: monitoring 13 100 0 
Instrument 6: linking farms and researchers 69 100 0 
Instrument 7: farmers’ training 31 100 0 
                                                     
o produto nacional é proteger exatamente o emprego e o produtor rural brasileiro. É uma política coerente: se 
quiser subsidiar, será melhor; se não puder, que o ingresso de produtos subsidiados não seja permitido’; 
b) Actor beta (PMDB): ‘E o nosso País, ao adotar a postura de abertura de seus mercados, que se impõe a cada 
passo, ficará, cada vez mais, inviabilizado em termos de sua produção agrícola. É preciso, portanto, uma 
política mais pragmática nessa matéria ou, melhor dizendo, a adoção de uma verdadeira política agrícola para 
o País. Uma política que leve em conta as diferenças regionais, por exemplo, porque, se neste momento os 
agricultores do Sul/Sudeste e Centro-Oeste do País se encontram nessas dificuldades, imaginemos os 
agricultores do semi-árido nordestino’. 
The first statement, pronounced by a senator of the PP (called ‘Actor alfa’), reveals a preference for a protectionist 
strategy, in contrast with target 5. For this reason, within our actor-by-statement matrix, a negative score was 
associated to this issue (target 5) for the PP. The second speech comes from a senator of the PMDB (called ‘Actor 
beta’), who highlights the differences between small farmers from the North-East and large farmers from the 
South, thus asking for a policy differentiation. Hence, the PMDB got a positive score for Target 4. 
 13 
 
Instrument 8: public subsidies 94 73 27 
Institution 1: rural advisory services 38 100 0 
Institution 2: producer cooperatives 69 100 0 
Institution 3: State agricultural banks 81 69 31 
 495 
Figure 1 presents the ‘conflict network’7. The presence of a large number of linkages is consistent 496 
with the remark of Leifeld and Haunss (2012) that strong polarisations are not generally found in policy 497 
networks. Nevertheless, the stakeholders are grouped into two distinct coalitions: one includes the SRB, 498 
ABAG and the CNA, and the other includes the MST, CUT and CONTAG. This reflects the historical 499 
polarization of the Brazilian rural system and its representative organizations. The presence of some 500 
thick lines despite the usual low polarisation indicates that some conflicts were quite intense. Indeed, 501 
the rural conflict has a significant socio-political relevance in Brazil: agricultural support policies have 502 
been used by the government to create consensus on several occasions, and so are a matter of intense 503 
debates within the political arena (Garcias and Kassouf, 2016). 504 
The group that includes the SRB, ABAG and the CNA (hereafter, the ‘productivity-focused 505 
group’), which was more in line with the WB’s desiderata, supported market-oriented reforms, while 506 
the group that includes the MST, CUT, and CONTAG (hereafter, the ‘welfare-focused group’) was 507 
more consistent with the FAO’s beliefs (see Table 2). In the beginning of the 90s, the SRB, ABAG and 508 
the CNA worked together through the Front of Brazilian Agriculture (Frente Ampla da Agropecuária 509 
Brasileira, FAAB) to establish a relationship with the federal government in order to obtain political 510 
concessions for the actors they represented (Sauer, 2008). The conflict between the two groups stems 511 
from socio-economic cleavages: the former group defended the interests of business farming, while the 512 
latter represented the interests of small producers. Santos (2011, p. 123) refers to the presence of ‘two 513 
coalitions in dispute’ (‘duas coalizões em disputa’) on agricultural policies8. While the MST, CUT and 514 
CONTAG, along with other actors involved in the Brazilian Land’s Cry, were on the frontline in re-515 
questing specific channels of support for family farms, the SRB, ABAG and the CNA supported the 516 
expansion of SNCR without any exclusive policy for family farms. 517 
The official documents on small producers and family farmers elaborated by the CNA present 518 
these groups – implicitly or explicitly – as having aspirations and claims similar to large producers 519 
(Moruzzi Marques, 2004). The CNA, the SRB and ABAG opposed the creation of ad hoc measures to 520 
support family farmers mainly because they did not agree with the idea that family and business agri-521 
culture experienced different working conditions. Nevertheless, after the launch of the debate on agri-522 
cultural policy which then resulted in the introduction of Pronaf, these organizations pushed for more 523 
flexible eligibility criteria for funding in order to satisfy their social base9. 524 
 525 
                                                     
7 The two ‘actor congruence networks’ can be found in the Appendix. 
8 This dispute resulted in the creation, in 1999, of two Ministries dedicated to agricultural themes: the Ministry of 
Agrarian Development(Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário), dealing with family farming, local development 
and agricultural planning, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (Ministério da Agricultura, 
Pecuária e Abastecimento), focused on large farm businesses and public policies for entrepreneurship. 
9 For example, the productivity-focused group argued that family management should be the only criterion for 
classifying the farms, thus excluding property size, income, and the hiring of employees. The CNA put pressure 
on the government to include, as an eligibility criterion, the presence of two permanent employees (which, indeed, 
became a rule of Pronaf), while CONTAG believed that the presence of temporary employees would have been 
enough (Grisa, 2012; Santos, 2011). 
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Figure 1. ‘Conflict network’ of the actors involved in the policy debate on Pronaf. 526 
 527 
Note: Squares indicate the actors belonging to the productivity-focused group, circles the actors belonging to the 528 
welfare-focused group, and diamonds other actors. Political organizations are marked in blue, civil society organ-529 
izations in green, and international organizations in red. 530 
Looking at Figure 1, three political actors appear to conflict mainly with the productivity-focused 531 
group: the PP, the PMDB, and the PT. Although the intensity of their conflict is higher toward the produc-532 
tivity-focused group, the PP and the PMDB also disagree with a (smaller) number of views supported 533 
by the welfare-focused group. The PT, however, disagrees only with the productivity-focused group10. 534 
The PT and the PPB are the actors with the lowest level of conflict within the network, despite the 535 
former expressing an opinion on twelve topics, and the latter only on eight (Table 3). Their low levels 536 
of conflict is confirmed also by network statistics: as shown in Table 5, these parties have the same 537 
lowest value of ‘betweenness centrality’ (0.231), while the members of the productivity-focused group 538 
have the highest. 539 
The MST obtains the highest score in Table 5 because, in addition to opposing the interests of 540 
business agriculture organizations (the CNA, ABAG and the SRB), it also dissents from CONTAG and 541 
CUT on some issues (Picolotto, 2011). Although the MST recognized the need of ad hoc instruments 542 
of agricultural support for family farmers, its priority was represented by the push for an agrarian reform 543 
to achieve more equitable access to land. Moreover, the group took a negative stance on technological 544 
innovation, with the complaint that some innovations are used mainly to increase profits by means of 545 
economies of scale (i.e., through land concentration), which is the logic of capitalist business agricul-546 
ture. On the contrary, they supported traditional production methods and the adoption of technologies 547 
adequate for the needs of smallholders. 548 
 549 
 550 
 551 
 552 
 553 
 554 
 555 
 556 
                                                     
10 The PT conflicts with the MST on two topics on which the latter expressed disagreement, contrary to all other 
actors. For this reason, the MST has at least one conflict edge with every actor, i.e. it has the highest value of 
betweenness centrality (Table 5). 
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Table 5. ‘Betweenness centrality’ indicator (actors listed in decreasing order). 557 
Actor 
‘Betweenness 
centrality’ 
Actor 
‘Betweenness 
centrality’ 
MST 8.082 PFL 0.607 
CNA 7.852 FAO 0.356 
ABAG 7.852 PTB 0.322 
SRB 7.852 PMDB 0.322 
WB 5.332 PRN 0.322 
CUT 2.356 PDT 0.322 
CONTAG 2.356 PPB 0.231 
PP 0.607 PT 0.231 
  558 
A possible explanation for the network position of the PT and the PPB relates to the topics they 559 
opposed. The PPB is the only actor that did not express a negative opinion on any topic, while the PT 560 
opposed only one topic: like most actors outside the productivity-focused group, it disagreed with the 561 
idea of giving priority to export crops over subsistence production. The larger centrality values obtained 562 
by the actors belonging either to the productivity-focused or the welfare-focused group point to their 563 
involvement in more conflict situations. Nevertheless, the members of the latter group displayed lower 564 
levels of ‘betweenness centrality’, which probably favoured the final approval of Pronaf. 565 
 566 
Discussion 567 
Results suggest that two conflicting coalitions (what we call the “productivity-focused group” and the 568 
“welfare-focused group”, respectively) encountered each other during the debates preceding Pronaf. 569 
Given the multiple and complex linkages among the stakeholders, including across the two groups, the 570 
final policy package must have been the result of political negotiations. To assess the relative success 571 
of each group, it is necessary to identify the elements included or excluded from the decree approved 572 
in 199611. Table 6 provides an overview of the policy outcome. 573 
Pronaf established specific funding for raising farm incomes (goal 1), raising productivity (goal 574 
2), stimulating the adoption of new technologies (goal 3), and aiding profit-oriented farmers (target 1), 575 
given that all actors (apart from the MST) agreed on these elements. The decree establishing Pronaf 576 
states that the actions of the programme are oriented towards ‘increasing the productive capacity [of the 577 
farms] and opening up new employment and income opportunities’, as well as ‘providing improvement 578 
of technologies [...] with a view to increasing the productivity of agricultural labour’ (article 2). 579 
The financial sustainability of the programme (instrument 1) was not enforced, as credit was pro-580 
vided at a fixed interest rate (Bianchini, 2015). Evidently, Pronaf was created with a primary focus on 581 
family businesses (target 2), and the funds targeted specific productions (target 3) rather than offering 582 
single farm payments. Although the decision to support a specific category of producers managed to 583 
prevail (interest rates, payment deadlines and administrative procedures were targeted at family farms), 584 
the measures also targeted specific crops or breeding (Chaddad and Jank, 2006). Thus, although Pronaf 585 
represented an agricultural support program targeted at family farms (differently from the SNCR), it 586 
maintained an operating logic similar to the SNCR by targeting specific productions, in as much as it 587 
adopted a sectorial perspective, i.e. by product and not by farm (Grisa et al., 2014). 588 
Interventions on land ownership (instrument 3) were not secured, given that this issue was under 589 
the jurisdiction of other programmes12. The decision to support primarily small farms (target 4), as well 590 
as the establishment of local producer groups (institution 2), are related to the emphasis on family farms. 591 
Their introduction within Pronaf is illustrative of the ‘defeat’ of the productivity-focused group. Many 592 
stakeholders supported the development of an integrated system tying research to family farming (in-593 
strument 6), while some (i.e., family farm organizations and the FAO) were in favour of organizing 594 
farmer training activities (instrument 7). Thus, the decree establishing Pronaf had the stated goal of 595 
favouring research activities, diffusing agricultural innovation and knowledge, and ‘stimulat[ing] and 596 
                                                     
11 Pronaf was established by the 1946 Decree of the President of the Republic of June 28th, 1996. 
12 Pronaf does not intervene in the subject of land ownership. This issue was handled by the National Institute of 
Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária, INCRA) with the creation of dedicated 
rural settlements and the ‘market-assisted land reform’ (Heredia et al., 2013; Mendes Pereira, 2007). 
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enhanc[ing] the development of experiences for family farmers and their representative organizations 597 
in the areas of education, training, research and production’ (article 2). 598 
Pronaf introduced rural advisory services (institution 1) for the first time in Brazil. These institu-599 
tions were organized into local (County Councils for Rural Development, Conselhos Municipais de 600 
Desenvolvimento Rural), state (State Council for Pronaf, Conselho Estadual do Pronaf), and federal 601 
boards (National Council for Pronaf, Conselho Nacional do Pronaf), with the participation of civil so-602 
ciety organizations and public servants. These services aimed to serve as channels for community par-603 
ticipation in the identification of priorities and the coordination of technical actions to promote the de-604 
velopment of the rural environment (Ferreira and Cardoso, 2004; Vaz de Moura, 2007). 605 
The role of the public sector emerged clearly. Indeed, the decree created public banks (institution 606 
3), and public subsidies were preferred to private loans (instrument 8). Furthermore, the preferential 607 
support for export crops that had characterized Brazilian agricultural policy during the 60s, 70s and 80s, 608 
was not included in Pronaf in order to stimulate family farm production (which involves self-consump-609 
tion and a focus on domestic markets). Nevertheless, this principle was maintained in the SNCR. Fi-610 
nally, three of the instruments identified at the start were not mentioned in the discussion, and, therefore, 611 
were not included in the law: tax concessions for agricultural producers (instrument 2), norms to reduce 612 
the power of informal intermediaries (instrument 4), and monitoring schemes to avoid the misuse of 613 
public funds (instrument 5). While anti-corruption measures and policy evaluation tools were (almost) 614 
never mentioned by the actors considered, the introduction of tax concessions was supported by mem-615 
bers of the productivity-focused group. Interestingly, the PT, the least conflicting actor in the network, 616 
never mentioned these instruments. 617 
 618 
Table 6. Final policy outcome: topics included (green), excluded (red), or not discussed (white). 619 
Statement Inclusion 
Goal 1: increasing farm incomes/salaries  
Goal 2: increasing productivity  
Goal 3: stimulating technological innovation  
Target 1: profit-oriented farmers  
Target 2: family farmers  
Target 3: specific productions  
Target 4: small farmers  
Target 5: export productions  
Instrument 1: financial sustainability  
Instrument 2: tax concessions  
Instrument 3: fair access to land  
Instrument 4: reduce power of intermediaries  
Instrument 5: monitoring  
Instrument 6: linking farms and researchers  
Instrument 7: farmers’ training  
Instrument 8: public subsidies  
Institution 1: rural advisory services  
Institution 2: producer cooperatives  
Institution 3: State agricultural banks  
 620 
The final shape of Pronaf was, thus, the outcome of negotiations between two groups diverging 621 
on several issues. The conformation of the groups is based on the polarization of Brazilian society that 622 
stems from the dualism between large-scale landowners (the CNA, ABAG and the SRB) and small 623 
producers (CONTAG, CUT and the MST) (Paulino, 2014). This cleavage was strengthened by a split 624 
in the alignment of Brazilian political parties, and by dissenting views between social movements – 625 
which were able to keep their autonomy with respect to political parties – and other organizations. In 626 
1995, during the government of Cardoso (PSDB), most of the parties with senators belonging to the 627 
Bancada Ruralista (the PP, the PFL, the PMDB, the PRN, and the PTB) were part of the ruling majority 628 
(Vigna, 2007). Therefore, their conflict with the productivity-focused group may have been due to con-629 
tingent political strategies rather than enduring diverging interests. This was the case with the PP and 630 
the PMDB, who were close to the agri-business.  631 
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Contrarily, the PT and the PDT expressed more affinity to the FAO’s proposals and the associa-632 
tions supporting family farmers (although they adopted a non-conflicting stance on most issues). Over-633 
all, only one of the positions of the PT (the need for an agrarian reform) was not reflected in Pronaf. 634 
The options favoured by both the welfare-focused group and the PT were approved without the need for 635 
the latter to enter into an open conflict with the productivity-focused group. 636 
We can thus conclude that the welfare-focused group managed to shape Pronaf in line with its 637 
political positions, although some of the issues backed by its members were not included in the final 638 
policy package, probably due to a political agreement between the PT and the influential centre-right 639 
parties or to the strong opposition from the productivity-focused group. In any case, the mobilization 640 
of the social movements representing family farmers (mainly in the framework of the Brazilian Land’s 641 
Cry) was key to the approval of Pronaf, as it gave them visibility and allowed them to enter the public 642 
agenda (Bianchini, 2015; Grisa, 2014; Moruzzi Marques, 2004; Picolotto, 2011; Schneider et al., 2004). 643 
 644 
Conclusions 645 
The analysis of competing coalitions in political debates is becoming increasingly popular in policy 646 
studies. However, empirical findings concerning agricultural policies are lacking. Our study aimed at 647 
filling this gap by focusing on the Brazilian National Program for Strengthening Family Agriculture 648 
(Pronaf), created to provide support to family farmers at favourable rates (Petrini et al., 2016). Since 649 
the latter half of the 90s, Pronaf has been the main Brazilian public policy for family farmers in terms 650 
of resources available and population coverage (Bianchini, 2015; Grisa et al., 2014; Grisa and Schnei-651 
der, 2014). We analysed the relationships that emerged in the discourse among the several actors in-652 
volved in this process, as well as the actors’ positions on potential changes in Brazilian agricultural 653 
policy. A prominent role was played by international organizations (the World Bank and the FAO), as 654 
is often the case in developing and emerging countries where structural reforms are shaped on their 655 
guidelines (Dixon et al., 2004). The conflict between a few large farm businesses and a multitude of 656 
small family farms, particularly significant in Brazil, was a matter of debate for the above international 657 
institutions, who were interested in promoting their own visions of Brazilian agriculture. Their partially 658 
contrasting visions were in turn used by Brazilian parties, unions and business associations to legitimize 659 
their positions on specific issues.     660 
The brokerage role played by the PT during the negotiation of Pronaf deserves specific focus. In 661 
2002, this party, represented by Lula, managed to win the presidential elections, courtesy of a broad 662 
alliance that included both centre and right-wing political parties (Sauer and Meszaros, 2017, 397). 663 
Despite the connections of the PT with social movements, this alliance was possible because its pro-664 
gramme lacked elements likely to generate harsh contrast with right-wing forces, such as a redistributive 665 
agrarian reform or ‘a programme of reforms to place peasant and family farming firmly at the centre of 666 
a sustainable and egalitarian model of agricultural development’ (Vergara-Camus and Kay, 2017, p. 667 
433). The PT expanded the programmes for supporting the rural poor without attempting to undermine 668 
the power of the rural élite. Our analysis shows that this conciliating attitude could already be observed 669 
in the mid-90s. 670 
One of the limitations of this study lies in the small number of declarations reviewed to extract 671 
the statements of the considered actors. Given that Pronaf was created in 1996, a time when press and 672 
institutional documents were rarely digitalized, the documents available were limited. For this reason, 673 
we assumed that a given person followed the guidelines of his or her affiliated organization (e.g., a 674 
political party, a union, a business association) and thus represented the organization’s position. The 675 
validity of our choice is confirmed by the fact that we found no discordant opinions in the few cases in 676 
which we had multiple individual declarations for a given organization. Another related limitation was 677 
the inability to attribute weights to the actors. We decided to consider all stakeholders to be on par with 678 
each other due to our focus on the political debate prior to the establishment of Pronaf. As all stake-679 
holders had the opportunity to express their own views on the issues identified, no clear power relations 680 
could be mapped.  681 
Although Pronaf has evolved and continues to do so since the 90s, we focus on the years of its 682 
creation. A longitudinal study would allow for a better understanding of how changes in the political 683 
discourse have been reflected in the programme since then, especially after the PT came into power in 684 
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2003. For example, rather than observing a progressive inclination to more radical stances presented by 685 
social movements like the MST, what has been noticed instead is a gradual abandonment of the provi-686 
sions of Pronaf, culminating in the abolition of the Ministry of Agrarian Development after the impeach-687 
ment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016. Further research could thus analyse the evolution of Pronaf along the 688 
years, with a focus on the changes introduced by the PT’s government. This would allow for an assess-689 
ment of whether there was any real attempt to pursue the goals of the organisations belonging to the 690 
welfare-focused group (the MST, CUT, and CONTAG) or whether the PT gradually dismissed their 691 
requests. 692 
 693 
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Forecasting and Social Change 60(2), 97-112. 745 
Delgado, G. C., 2004. O setor de subsistência na economia e na sociedade brasileira: gênese histórica, 746 
reprodução e configuração contemporânea. Texto para Discussão n. 1025. Brasília: 747 
IPEA.Delgado, G. C., 2012. Do capital financeiro na agricultura à economia do agronegócio: 748 
mudanças cíclicas em meio século (1965-2012). Porto Alegre: Ed. UFRGS. 749 
Delgado, N. G., 2001. Política econômica, ajuste externo e agricultura. In: S. Leite (Ed.), Políticas 750 
públicas e agricultura no Brasil. Porto Alegre (RS), Editora da UFRGS, pp. 15-52. 751 
Delgado, N. G., 2010. O papel do rural no desenvolvimento nacional: da modernização conservadora 752 
dos anos 1970 ao Governo Lula. In: Delgado, N. G. (Ed.), Brasil rural em debate: coletânea de 753 
artigos. Brasília (DF): CONDRAF/NEAD, pp. 28-78. 754 
Dethier, J.-J., Effenberger, A., 2012. Agriculture and development: A brief review of the literature. 755 
Economic Systems 36(2), 175-205. 756 
Diaz Osorio, J., 2007. Family Farm Agriculture: Factors Limiting its Competitivity and Policy Sugges-757 
tions. OECD Review of agricultural policy in Chile. University of Talca, Chile. 758 
Dixon, J., Taniguchi, K., Wattenbach, H., Tanyeri-Arbur, A., 2004. Smallholders, globalization and 759 
policy analysis. AGSF Occasional Paper 5. Rome: Agricultural Management, Marketing and Fi-760 
nance Service (AGSF), Agricultural Support Systems Division, Food and Agriculture organiza-761 
tion of the United Nations. 762 
Ellis, F., 1992. Agricultural Po1icies in Developing Countries. New York: Cambridge University Press. 763 
Evenson, R. E., 2001. Economic impacts of agricultural research and extension. In: B. L. Gardner, G. 764 
C. Rausser (Eds.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 1, Part A. Elsevier, pp. 573-765 
628. 766 
Favareto, A., 2007. Paradigmas do desenvolvimento rural em questão. São Paulo: Iglu/Fapesp. 767 
Ferreira, J. A., Cardoso, J. L., 2004. Papel do conselho municipal de desenvolvimento rural: a 768 
experiência de Espírito Santo do Pinhal, Estado de São Paulo. Informações Econômicas 34(1), 769 
18-27. 770 
Feder, G., Birner, R., Anderson, J. R., 2011. The private sector's role in agricultural extension systems: 771 
potential and limitations. Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging Economies 1(1), 772 
31-54. 773 
Fisher, D. R., Leifeld, P., Iwaki, Y., 2013. Mapping the ideological networks of American climate pol-774 
itics. Climatic Change 116(3), 523-45. 775 
Fischer, M., Ingold, K., Ivanova, S., 2017. Information exchange under uncertainty: The case of uncon-776 
ventional gas development in the United Kingdom. Land Use Policy 67, 200-211. 777 
 20 
 
Flexor, G., Grisa, C., 2014. The Institutionalization of Family Farming Policy in Brazil: Ideas, Institu-778 
tions and Actors. In: M. Rocha Lukic, C. Tomazini (Eds.), Analyzing Public Policies in Latin 779 
America: A Cognitive Approach. Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 63-780 
82. 781 
Flexor, G., Grisa, C., 2016. Contention, ideas, and rules: the institutionalization of family farm policy 782 
in Brazil. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 41(1), 1-15. 783 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations-FAO, 2001. Reform and Decentralization of 784 
Agricultural Services: A Policy Framework. FAO Agricultural Policy and Economic Develop-785 
ment Series No. 7. Rome: FAO. 786 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations-FAO, 2014. The state of food and agriculture 787 
2014: Innovation in family farming. Rome: FAO 788 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations-FAO, 2017. FaoStat Data. Available online 789 
at: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data [accessed on 30 July 2017]. 790 
Fuglie, K. O., Wang, S. L., Ball, V. E., 2012. Productivity growth in agriculture: an international per-791 
spective. UK: CABI. 792 
Gagliardi, F., 2008. Institutions and economic change: A critical survey of the new institutional ap-793 
proaches and empirical evidence. The Journal of Socio-Economics 37, 416-443. 794 
Garcias, M. O., Kassouf, A. L., 2016. Assessment of rural credit impact on land and labor productivity 795 
for Brazilian family farmers. Nova Economia 26(3), 721-746. 796 
Garner, E., de la O Campos, A. P., 2014. Identifying the “family farm”: an informal discussion of the 797 
concepts and definitions. ESA Working Paper No. 14-10. FAO: Rome. 798 
Gasques, J. C., Bastos, E. T., Valdes, C., Bacchi, M. R. P., 2012. Produtividade da agricultura brasileira 799 
e os efeitos de algumas políticas. Revista de Política Agrícola 21(3), 83-92. 800 
Gazolla, M., Schneider, S., 2013. Qual ‘fortalecimento’ da agricultura familiar? Uma análise do Pronaf 801 
crédito de custeio e investimento no Rio Grande do Sul. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural 802 
51(1), 45-68. 803 
Gonçalves Neto, W., 1997. Estado e agricultura no Brasil: política agrícola e modernização econômica 804 
brasileira, 1960-1980. São Paulo (SP): Hucitec. 805 
Graeub, B. E., Chappell, M. J., Wittman, H., Ledermann, S., Bezner Kerr, R., Gemmill-Herren, B., 806 
2016. The State of Family Farms in the World. World Development 87, 1-15. 807 
Graziano da Silva, J., 2003. Agricultura familiar e tecnologia. Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS. 808 
Grisa, C., 2012. Políticas públicas para a agricultura familiar no Brasil: produção e institucionalização 809 
das ideias. PhD Thesis Social Sciences Graduate Program – Development, Agriculture and So-810 
ciety, Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro. 811 
Grisa, C., Schneider, S., 2014. Três gerações de políticas públicas para a agricultura familiar e formas 812 
de interação entre sociedade e Estado no Brasil. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural 52(1), 813 
125-146. 814 
Grisa, C., Wesz Jr, V. J., Buchweitz, V. D., 2014. Revisitando o Pronaf: velhos questionamentos, novas 815 
interpretações. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural 52(2), 323-346. 816 
Grito da Terra Brasil, 1994. Pauta nacional de reivindicações. Brasília (DF): CUT/DNTR, CONTAG, 817 
MST, MAB, MONAPE, CNS, CAPOIB. 818 
Guanziroli, C. E., 1995. Diretrizes de política agrária e de desenvolvimento sustentável, Relatório final 819 
do projeto UTF/BRA/036. Brasília: FAO/INCRA. 820 
Guanziroli, C. E., 2001. Agricultura familiar e reforma agrária no século XXI. Rio de Janeiro: 821 
Garamond. 822 
Guanziroli, C. E., Buainain, A. M., Di Sabbato, A., 2012. Dez anos de evolução da agricultura familiar 823 
no Brasil: (1996 e 2006). Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural 50(2), 351-370. 824 
 21 
 
Gunes, E., Movassaghi, H., 2017. Comparative Analysis of Agricultural Credit System and Organiza-825 
tion in Selected Countries. International Journal of Applied Agricultural Sciences 3(5), 123-135. 826 
Guyomard, H., Le Mouël, C., Gohin, A., 2004. Impacts of alternative agricultural income support 827 
schemes on multiple policy goals. European Review of Agricultural Economics 31(2), 125-148. 828 
Hajer, M. A., 1993. Discourse coalitions and the institutionalization of practice: The case of acid rain 829 
in Britain. In: F. Fischer, J. Forester (Eds.), The argumentative turn in policy analysis and plan-830 
ning. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, pp. 43-76. 831 
Hazell, P., Poulton, C., Wiggins, S., Dorward, A., 2007. The Future of small farms for poverty reduction 832 
and growth. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2020 Discussion Paper No. 42. 833 
Washington D.C.: IFPRI. 834 
 835 
Heredia, B. M. A., Palmeira, M., Leite, S. P., 2010. Sociedade e Economia do Agronegócio. Revista 836 
Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 25(74), 159-76. 837 
Heredia, B., Medeiros, L., Palmeira, M., Cintrão, R., Leite, S. P., 2013. Análise dos impactos regionais 838 
da reforma agrária no Brasil. Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura 18(1), 73-111. 839 
Helfand, S. M., 2001. The distribution of subsidized agricultural credit in Brazil: Do interest groups 840 
matter? Development and Change 32, 465-490. 841 
Helfand, S. M., de Rezende, G. C., 2004. The impact of sector-specific and economy-wide policy re-842 
forms on the agricultural sector in Brazil: 1980-98. Contemporary Economic Policy 22(2), 194-843 
212. 844 
Kumar, A., 2005. Access to Financial Services in Brazil. Washington D. C.: World Bank. 845 
Leifeld, P., 2009. Die Untersuchung von Diskursnetzwerken mit dem Discourse Network Analyzer 846 
(DNA). In: V. Schneider, F. Janning, P. Leifeld, Th. Malang (Eds.), Politiknetzwerke. Modelle, 847 
Anwendungen und Visualisierungen. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, pp. 391-404. 848 
Leifeld, P., 2010. Software. Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA). Available online at: 849 
http://www.philipleifeld.com/software/software.html [accessed on 10 June 2017]. 850 
Leifeld, P., 2012. Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA). Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on 851 
Collective Goods. 852 
Leifeld, P., 2013. Reconceptualizing Major Policy Change in the Advocacy Coalition Framework: A 853 
Discourse Network Analysis of German Pension Politics. Policy Studies Journal 41(1), 169-198. 854 
Liefeld, P., Haunss, S., 2012. Political discourse networks and the conflict over software patents in 855 
Europe. European Journal of Political Research 51(3), 382-409. 856 
Leite, S. P., 2001. Análise do financiamento da política de crédito rural no Brasil (1980-1996). Estudos 857 
Sociedade e Agricultura 16, 129-63. 858 
Leite, S. P., 2015. Politiques publiques et agribusiness: Une analyse de la politique de financement 859 
agricole actuelle du Brésil. Géographie Économie Societé 17(4), 433-458. 860 
Leite, S. P., Wesz Jr., V. J., 2014. Estado, políticas públicas e agronegócio no Brasil: revisitando o papel 861 
do crédito rural. Revista Pós Ciências Sociais 11(22), 83-108. 862 
Markelova, H., Meinzen-Dick, R., Hellin, J., Dohrn, S., 2009. Collective action for smallholder market 863 
access. Food Policy 34, 1-7. 864 
Mattei, L., 2006. PRONAF 10 anos: mapa da produção acadêmica. Brasília: MDA. 865 
Mattei, L., 2010. Análise da produção acadêmica sobre o Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da 866 
Agricultura Familiar (PRONAF) entre 1996 e 2006. Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura 18(1), 56-867 
97. 868 
Mattei, L., 2012. A reforma agrária brasileira: evolução do número de famílias assentadas no período 869 
pós-redemocratização do país. Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura 20(1), 301-325. 870 
 22 
 
McMahon, M., 2012. Latin America: Public agricultural advisory services. In: OECD (Ed.), Improving 871 
Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems. OECD Conference Proceedings. doi: 872 
10.1787/9789264167445 873 
Medeiros, L. S., 2001. Sem terra, assentados, agricultores familiares: considerações sobre os conflitos 874 
sociais e as formas de organização dos trabalhadores rurais brasileiros. In: Giarracca, N. (Org.). 875 
¿Una nueva ruralidad en América Latina? Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2001, p. 103-128. 876 
Mendes Pereira, J. M., 2007. The World Bank’s ‘Market-Assisted’ Land Reform as a Political Issue: 877 
Evidence from Brazil (1997-2006). European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 878 
82, 21-49. 879 
Meyer, R. L., 2011. Subsidies as an Instrument in Agricultural Development Finance: Review. Joint 880 
Discussion Paper of the Joint Donor CABFIN Initiative. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 881 
Moruzzi Marques, P. E., 2004. Concepções concorrentes em torno das políticas públicas de apoio à 882 
agricultura familiar: uma releitura sobre a construção do PRONAF. In: Anais do XLII Congresso 883 
Brasileiro de Economia e Sociologia Rural. Cuiabá/MT. 884 
Niederle, P. A. et al. 2017. Narrative disputes on family farming public policies in Brazil: conservative 885 
attacks and restricted countermovements. The 5th International Conference of the BRICS Initi-886 
ative for Critical Agrarian Studies. Moscow, Russia. 887 
Norder, L. A., 2014. Políticas agrárias e diversidade socioambiental. Revista Brasileira de Gestão e 888 
Desenvolvimento Regional 10(2), 317-337. 889 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD, 2017. Agricultural Policy Monitor-890 
ing and Evaluation 2017. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_pol-2017-en 891 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD, 2018. Agricultural support (indi-892 
cator). doi:10.1787/6ea85c58-en [accessed on 23 January 2018]. 893 
Ondetti, G., 2016. The social function of property, land rights and social welfare in Brazil. Land Use 894 
Policy 50, 29-37. 895 
Paarlberg, R., 2013. Food politics: What everyone needs to know. New York: Oxford University Press. 896 
Paulino, E. T., 2014. The agricultural, environmental and socio-political repercussions of Brazil’s land 897 
governance system. Land Use Policy 36, 134-144. 898 
Petrini, M. A., Rocha, J. V., Brown, J. C., Bispo, R. C., 2016. Using an analytic hierarchy process 899 
approach to prioritize public policies addressing family farming in Brazil. Land Use Policy, 51, 900 
85-94. 901 
Picolotto, E. L., 2011. As mãos que alimentam a nação: agricultura familiar, sindicalismo e política. 902 
PhD Thesis Social Sciences Graduate Program – Development, Agriculture and Society, Federal 903 
Rural University of Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro. 904 
Picolotto, E. L., 2014. Os atores da construção da categoria agricultura familiar no Brasil. Revista de 905 
Economia e Sociologia Rural 52 (1), 63-84. 906 
Prell, C., 2012. Social Network Analysis. History, theory and methodology. Los Angeles: SAGE.Pretty, 907 
J., Sutherland, W. J., Ashby, J., (...), Wilson, J., Pilgrim, S., 2010. The top 100 questions of im-908 
portance to the future of global agriculture. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 909 
8(4), 219-236.  910 
Queiroz, M. I. P., 2009. Uma categoria rural esquecida. In: Welch, C. et al. (Org.). Camponeses 911 
brasileiros: leituras e interpretações clássicas. São Paulo: Ed. UNESP. 912 
Resende, C. M., Martins Mafra, R. L., 2016. Desenvolvimento Rural e Reconhecimento: tensões e 913 
dilemas envolvendo o Pronaf. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural 54(2), 261-280. 914 
Rivera, W. M., Sulaiman, V. R., 2009. Extension: Object of reform, engine for innovation. Outloook 915 
on Agriculture 38(3), 267-273. 916 
 23 
 
Sabatier, P. A., 1988. An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented 917 
learning therein. Policy Sciences 21(2), 129-168. 918 
Sabatier, P. A., Jenkins-Smith, H. C., 1993. Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition ap-919 
proach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 920 
Sabatier, P. A., Weible, C. M., 2007. The advocacy coalition framework. In Sabatier P. A. (Ed.), The-921 
ories of the policy process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 922 
Sanches Peraci, A., 2011. Family Agriculture Conceptual Evolution, Challenges and Institutional 923 
Framework. V Working Group Meeting (GT2025), Hunger Free Latin America and the Carib-924 
bean 2025. Rome: FAO. 925 
Santos, F. P., 2011. Coalizões de interesses e a configuração política da agricultura familiar no Brasil. 926 
PhD Thesis (Doutorado em Administração Pública e Governo) – Escola de Administração de 927 
Empresas de São Paulo (FGV-SP). São Paulo (SP). 928 
Sauer, S., 2008. Agricultura familiar versus agronegócio: a dinâmica sociopolítica do campo 929 
brasileiro. Brasília: Embrapa. 930 
Sauer, S., Mészáros, G., 2017. The political economy of land struggle in Brazil under Workers' Party 931 
governments. Journal of Agrarian Change 17(2), 397-414. 932 
Schiff, M., Valdes, A., 1992. The political economy of agricultural pricing policy: volume 4 - a synthe-933 
sis of the economics in developing countries. A World Bank comparative study. Baltimore, MD: 934 
The Johns Hopkins University Press. 935 
Schmidt, V. A., 2008. Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. An-936 
nual Review of Political Science 11, 303-326. 937 
Schmidt, V. A., Radaelli, C. M., 2004. Policy change and discourse in Europe: Conceptual and meth-938 
odological issues. West European Politics 27(2), 183-210. 939 
Schneider, S., Cazella, A., Mattei, L., 2004. Histórico, caracterização e dinâmica recente do Pronaf-940 
Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar. In: Schneider, S., Silva M. K., 941 
Marques, P. E. M. (Eds.), Políticas públicas e participação social no Brasil rural. Porto Alegre 942 
(RS): Editora da UFRGS, pp. 21-49. 943 
Schneider, S., 2006. A diversidade da agricultura familiar. Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS. 944 
Schultz, C., Ahlert, A., 2016. O Pronaf como política pública de apoio à agricultura familiar: um estudo 945 
de caso do município de Maripá – PR. Ciências Sociais Aplicadas em Revista 16(30), 77-94. 946 
Simionatto, I., Rodrigues Costa, C., 2012. Como os dominantes dominam: o caso da bancada ruralista. 947 
Temporalis 12(24), 215-37. 948 
Smith, S. C., Rothbaum, J., 2013. Cooperatives in a Global Economy: Key Economic Issues, Recent 949 
Trends, and Potential for Development. Institute for International Economic Policy Working Pa-950 
per Series, 2013-6. 951 
Sumberg, J., Thompson, J., Woodhouse, P., 2012. Why agronomy in the developing world has become 952 
contentious. Agriculture and Human Values 30 (1), 71-83. 953 
Teixeira, J. C., 2005. Modernização da agricultura no Brasil: impactos econômicos, sociais e ambien-954 
tais. Revista Eletrônica da Associação dos Geógrafos Brasileiros 2(2): 21-42. 955 
Turvey, C. G., 2013. Policy rationing in rural credit markets. Agricultural Finance Review 73(2), 209-956 
232. 957 
Vaz de Moura, J. T., 2007. Os Conselhos Municipais de Desenvolvimento Rural (CMDRS) e a 958 
construção democrática: esfera pública de debate entre agricultores familiares e o Estado? Or-959 
ganizações Rurais & Agroindustriais 9(2), 241-255. 960 
Vasconcellos, M., Vasconcellos, A. M., 2012. Social movement, public policy changes and partnerships 961 
building for local development. Interações 13(2), 243-258. 962 
 24 
 
Vergara-Camus, L., Kay, C., 2017. The agrarian political economy of left-wing governments in Latin 963 
America: Agribusiness, peasants, and the limits of neo-developmentalism. Journal of Agrarian 964 
Change 17(2), 415-437. 965 
Vicente, J. R., Vosti, S. A., 1995. An IEA-CATI objective survey data test at rural holding level for 966 
technology adoption. Agricultura em Sao Paulo 42(2), 129-148. 967 
Vieira Filho, J. E. R., da Silveira, J. M. F. J., 2012. Mudança Tecnológica na Agricultura: uma revisão 968 
crítica da literatura e o papel das economias de aprendizado. Revista de Economia e Sociologia 969 
Rural 50(4), 721-742. 970 
Vigna, E., 2001. Bancada ruralista: um grupo de interesse. Argumento n. 8 INESC. 971 
Vigna, E., 2007. Bancada ruralista: maior grupo de interesse do congresso nacional. INESC, Ano VII 972 
– n. 12. 973 
Wade, R., 2010. After the Crisis: Industrial Policy and the Developmental State in Low-Income Coun-974 
tries. Global Policy 1(2), 150-161. 975 
Welch, C. A., Sauer, S., 2015. Rural unions and the struggle for land in Brazil. Journal of Peasant 976 
Studies 42(6), 1109-1135. 977 
Westercamp, C., Nouri, M., Oertel, A., 2015. Agricultural Credit: Assessing the Use of Interest Rate 978 
Subsidies. Collection: A Savoir Collection n. 29: AFD Publishing. 979 
Wesz Jr, V. J., 2010. Política pública de agroindustrialização na agricultura familiar: uma análise do 980 
Pronaf-Agroindústria. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural 48(4), 567-596. 981 
Wolford, W., 2005. Agrarian Moral Economies and Neoliberalism in Brazil: Competing Worldviews 982 
and the State in the Struggle for Land. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 37(2), 983 
241-261. 984 
World Bank, 1994a. Brazil: the management of agriculture, rural development and natural resources. 985 
Report nº. 11783-BR, v. I.  986 
World Bank, 1994b. Brazil: the management of agriculture, rural development and natural resources. 987 
Report nº. 11783-BR, v. II. 988 
Zani, F. B., da Costa, F. L., 2014. Evaluation of programa nacional de fortalecimento da agricultura 989 
familiar implementation - New perspectives of analysis. Revista de Administração Pública 48(4), 990 
889-912.  991 
 25 
 
Appendix 992 
Figure 1A. Congruence network: agreements of the actors involved in policy debate on Pronaf. 993 
 994 
Note: See Note to Figure 1. 995 
 996 
Figure 2A. Congruence network: not agreements of the actors involved in policy debate on Pronaf. 997 
 998 
Note: See Note to Figure 1. 999 
